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Accountants' Scope of Liability
For Defective Financial Reports
By LLOYD ALAN LEVrrIN*
IF AN accountant, in performing an audit for his client, negligently
misrepresents his client's financial condition, can a third party lender
or investor who suffers financial loss by his reliance upon that mis-
representation recover damages from the accountant? Until recently
the answer has been no; privity of contract has been regarded as an
absolute necessity to maintain an action for negligent misrepresenta-
tion.' But in 1958 the California Supreme Court, in Biakanja v. Irving,2
repudiated the privity requirement in cases where the injury is to
intangible economic interests:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm-
This decision thus unleashes another "assault upon the citadel of
privity"4 and is likely to have a substantial effect on the liability of
* B.S. 1954, University of California; M.B.A. 1956, Wharton Graduate School of
Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania; C.P.A. 1960, State of California;
L.L.B. 1961, University of San Francisco; Assistant Professor of Business, San Francisco
State College; member, California Bar.
I Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 AtI. 783, 8 A.L.R. 461 (1919).
249 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958); 12 ARx. L. Ev. 413
(1958); 46 CALIF. L. RBv. 851 (1958); 27 FolnnAm L. REv. 290 (1958); 72 HARv. L.
REv. 380 (1958); 7 KAN. L. RFv. 83 (1958); 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 811 (1958); U.C.L.A.L.
Bnv. 681 (1958).
3 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958).
4 "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace. How
far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite subject of judicial discussion." Cardozo,
C. J. in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
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accountants who heretofore have been insulated from third party lia-
bility for ordinary negligence. How will this decision be applied to
accountants? What is the scope of an accountant's liability?
Nature of Accounting Services
Public accountancy is a highly skilled5 and technical profession
embracing many types of services. The primary service of the inde-
pendent public accountant is to examine the financial statements of
his client and to express an expert opinion-in the form of a report-
on the fairness with which they present financial position and results
of operations.0 Although the report is generally addressed to the client,
in many instances it reaches innumerable interested parties in the
investing and lending public, who place great weight on the opinion
expressed. Difficult legal problems have arisen in defining the aud-
itor's responsibility to these parties.
Liability to Client
Accountants" Duty
The contract of employment creates a relationship from which a
duty arises to perform the promised services with due care.7 Ac-
countants, as members of a skilled profession, are subject to the same
rules of negligence in the practice of their profession as are members
of other skilled professions.8 A recent California case states the duty
of accountants as follows:
As members of a skilled profession they are experts .... "The serv-
ices of experts are sought because of their special skill. They have
a duty to exercise the ordinary skill and competence of members of
their profession, and a failure to discharge that duty will subject them
to liability for negligence. Those who hire such persons are not justi-
fied in expecting infallibility, but can expect only reasonable care
and competence. They purchase service, not insurance .... "I
If the accountant's conduct falls below professional standards, he
may be held liable to his client for breach of contract, or in tort for
5 Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y. Supp. 820 (1905).
6 Lvy, AccouerTA~rs' LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1954).
7 Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116
(1934); O'Neill v. Atlas Auto. Fin. Corp., 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A.2d 782 (1940).
8 Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1962);
Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955).
9 Lindner v. Barlow, Davis & Wood, 210 Cal. App. 2d 660, 665, 27 Cal. Rptr. 101,
104 (1962).
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breach of the general duty to exercise due care, arising out of the
contract relationship. 10
When the accountant undertakes to perform the usual audit which
is to culminate in the expression of his expert opinion on the fairness
of his client's statement, it is implied that he will follow generally
accepted auditing standards." These standards are determined by
reference to technical literature and expert testimony.' 2 Auditing
standards should be distinguished from auditing procedures. 13 The
standards are the same for every audit whereas the procedures may
differ. Auditing procedures adequate under one set of circumstances
may not be adequate under another. Thus, any attempt at classify-
ing various accounting procedures as legally acceptable or unaccept-
able would be fruitless. Similarly, cases involving alleged malpractice
of accountants must be read with the understanding that failure to
follow certain procedures may be negligence in one set of circum-
stances but not in another.
Failure to Discover Defalcations
Is the auditor's failure to detect embezzlement negligence? The
greatest number of reported cases in which the client sues his account-
ant arise out of the alleged failure of the accountant to discover fraud
on the part of the client's employees. 14 It should be pointed out that
10 For the general proposition of liability either in tort or contract for the negligent
performance of a contractual duty, see 35 CAL. JuR. 2d Negligence 15; 2 HAwPER &
J ams, TORTS 1049-50 (1956); PRossnsi, ToRTs 478-86 (2d ed. 1955). For the rule that
alternative remedies in tort or contract are available as applied to actions against account-
ants, see L. B. Labs., Inc. v. Mitchell, 39 Cal. 2d 56, 244 P.2d 385 (1952), Dantzler
Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934), Annot.
54 A.L.R.2d 324, 330 (1957).
The fact that alternative remedies may be available may be critical with respect to
(1) statute of limitations, (2) application of contributory negligence and (3) damages.
See Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VyD. L. REV.
797 (1959).
"1 See LEvy, AccouNTANTs' LEGAL BEsPoNsmILrcY 9 (1954); Hawkins, Professional
Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797, 798 (1959).
The accountant may limit his liability by expressly stating in his contract that he
will not undertake the usual examination. See LEVY, AccouNTANTS' LEGAL RESPoNsI-
BmrrY 15 (1954).
12 See Comin'r oN AunrriNs PROCEDURE, AmERcAN INsTrruTE OF CEmrir=
PUBLIC AccoUNTANrs, AUDrIING STANDARDs AND PROCEDURES 15-16 (1963) for a state-
ment of the generally accepted auditing standards as approved and adopted by the mem-
bership of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
'1 Id. at 15.
14 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook, 35 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940); Dantzler Lumber
& Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934); City of East
Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N.W. 181 (1913); National Sur. Corp. v.
Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939); Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div.
55, 208 N.Y. Supp. 259, aff'd without opinion, 242 N.Y. 569, 152 N.E. 431 (1925);
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the objective of the usual audit examination is to render an opinion
on the financial statements and not to discover defalcations. 15 How-
ever, if the defalcation went undiscovered because the accountant
had not exercised reasonable care in the performance of this examina-
tion, he is liable.16
Liability to Third Parties for Negligence
The third party bringing an action against an accountant for a
negligent misrepresentation faces two major difficulties. The first is
historical-the doctrine of privity. Under this doctrine a plaintiff can-
not maintain an action in tort for harm caused by the defendant's
negligent performance of a contract unless the plaintiff is in "privity
of contract" (i.e., had contractual relations) with the defendant.'
7
This obstacle has now been removed at least in California by the
decision in Biakanja v. Irving.'s The second obstacle is public policy.
The scope of liability for a negligent misrepresentation causing only
intangible economic loss is more limited than the scope of liability
for negligent conduct causing personal injury or tangible harm to
property.19
Privity Doctrine
The "privity doctrine" was established in 1842 in the leading Eng-
lish case of Winterbottom v. Wright.20 The driver of a stagecoach
brought an action against a contractor who had agreed with the post-
master general to provide and keep the stagecoach in repair. The
coach collapsed, injuring the driver, who sought to recover against
the contractor on account of its defective construction. The Court
Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y. Supp. 820 (1905); O'Neill
v. Atlas Auto. Fin. Corp., 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A.2d 782 (1940); International Labs.
Ltd. v. Dewar, 41 Man. 329 (1933); Fox & Son v. Morrish, Grant & Co., 35 T.L.R. 126
(K.B. 1918); see Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 338 (1957).
15 Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 8 IMI. App. 2d 331, 132 N.E.2d 27 (1956); Lxvy,
AccouNTAir's LEGAL REsPoNsmLrY 12-16 (1954); Carey, Defalcation in Relation to
Audit, Internal Control and Fidelity Bonds, 83 J. AccouNrTcy 353 (1947).
6 Board of County Comm'rs of Allen County v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 F.2d 1006
(1940) (recovery allowed); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cook, 35 F. Supp. 160 (E. D. Mich.
1940) (recovery allowed); Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 115
Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934) (held to state a cause of action); National Sur. Corp. v.
Lybrand, 256 App. Div. 226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1939) (held to make a case for the jury);
Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y. Supp. 820 (1905) (held to
state a cause of action); Fox & Son v. Morrish, Grant & Co., 35 T.L.R. 126 (K.B. 1918)
(recovery allowed); Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 338 (1957).
17 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) (Chief Justice Waite dissenting).
1849 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
19 See PRossER, ToRTs 543 (2d ed. 1955); 1 HAmumm & JAmEs, ToRTS 545-51 (1956).
20 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
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of Exchequer denied him any right of recovery on the ground that
there was no privity of contract between the parties. Lord Abinger
said:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the
plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along
the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring
a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts
as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and out-
rageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
21
In 1895 the California Supreme Court adopted this common law
rule of non-liability to persons not in privity in the case of Buckley v.
Gray.
2 2
Public policy changed, and what would be "absurd and outrageous"
to Lord Abinger was not so to Justice Cardozo who in 1916, in the
leading case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,28 held a manufacturer
liable to a third party, not in privity, who was injured by a negligently
constructed automobile. The privity doctrine was thus repudiated in
the area of manufacturers' liability.24 However, where the defendant's
negligence did not cause tangible harm, but only harm to intangible
economic interests (the usual result of negligent performance of serv-
ices), the doctrine maintained its strength. The breakthrough came
in the case of Glanzer v. Shepard,25 where the New York Court of
Appeals repudiated the privity doctrine in the case of a negligent mis-
representation causing only pecuniary loss. 26 In that case the defend-
21 Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. The court held that no action could be main-
tained on the contract; however, an erroneous interpretation of Lord Abinger's dicta led
lawyers and courts to suppose that there could be no action even in tort. See PRossan,
TORTS 497-98 (2d ed. 1955); Labott, Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract, 16
L.Q. REv. 168, 171 (1900); see Lord Atkin, in Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932), A.C.
562, 588-89; see dissenting opinion of Denning, L. J. in Candler v. Crane, Christmas &
Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 176-77.
22 110 Cal. 339, 42 Pac. 900 (1895), disapproved in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), overruled in Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr.
821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961). In Buckley v. Gray, it was held that legatees of a will could
not sue an attorney for the negligent preparation of the will which caused injury to them,
since there was no privity between the attorney and the legatees.
23 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2- See PossEn, ToaRTs §§ 84-85 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Seavey, Mr. Justice
Cardozo and The Law of Torts, 52 HAuv. L. Rnv. 372, 376-79 (1939). The MacPherson
doctrine has been adopted in California. See Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co., 1 Cal.
2d 229, 231, 34 P.2d 481, 482 (1934).
25 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
26 See Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and The Law of Torts, 52 HAIv. L. REv. 372,
394-98 (1939); Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Negligent Misrepresentation
by Accountants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 476-77 (1951); 1 Im'Rn & JAmss, ToRTS 546
(1956); and the following notes and comments: 7 CoRNELL L.Q. 355 (1922); 21 MicE.
L. REv. 200 (1923).
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ant, a public weigher, was requested by a vendor to weigh beans
which he had sold and to issue a certificate of weight to the buyer.
Due to a negligent overstatement of weight, the buyer paid an exces-
sive purchase price. The buyer sued the weigher to recover the amount
of overpayment. The weigher argued no liability because he had no
contractual relations with the buyer. Speaking through Justice Car-
dozo, the Court stated:
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer as well as seller in
the situation here disclosed. The plaintiff's use of the certificates was
. . . a consequence, which to the weigher's knowledge, was the end
and aim of the transaction.... The defendants held themselves out
to the public as skilled and careful in their calling. They knew that
the beans had been sold, and that on the faith of their certificate
payment would be made. They sent a copy to the plaintiffs for the
very purpose of inducing action.... In such circumstances, assump-
tion of the task of weighing was the assumption of a duty to weigh
carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct was to be governed.
We do not need to state the duty in terms of contract or of privity....
Given the contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law (cf.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390) .
7
Recently the California Supreme Court followed this trend, and
in the case of Biakanja v. Irving28 repudiated the privity doctrine as
to intangible economic interests. In that case, a non-lawyer negli-
gently drew up a will which proved to be invalid. The California
Supreme Court held the non-lawyer liable to the intended legatee
although they were not in privity of contract. Relying on the Glanzer
(bean weigher) case, the Court stated:
Here, the "end and aim" of the transaction was to provide for the
passing of Maroevich's estate to plaintiff. (See Glanzer v. Shepard.
*..,) Defendant must have been aware from the terms of the will
itself that, if faulty solemnization caused the will to be invalid, plain-
tiff would suffer the very loss which occurred. 29
Scope of Liability-Intangible Economic
Loss and Tangible Harm
Although the court in the Biakanja case declared that lack of privity
is no longer a defense in an action for economic harm, it did not declare
27233 N.Y. 236, 238-39; 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
2849 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The only California case in point prior to
Biakania expressly repudiated the Glanzer rule. Bilich v. Barnett, 103 Cal. App. 2d 921,
229 P.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1951) (surveyors held not liable for negligently preparing
grade sheets for a trucking company although they were furnished directly to plaintiff
contractor with knowledge that he intended to rely thereon).
2949 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958). There is a major distinction between
the cases. Reliance of the plaintiff, an important factor in Glanzer, is absent in Biakania.
See 46 CA inn. L. REv., 851, 853 n.16. (1958).
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that the defendant's scope of duty is unlimited so that any third person
in the land who is harmed as a result of the defendant's negligence
may recover. "The determination whether in a specific case the de-
fendant will be liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy .... ,"30
The leading American case with respect to the scope of duty of
the negligent purveyor of business information is Ultrarnares Corp. v.
Touche.31 In Ultramares the defendants were a firm of certified public
accountants employed by Fred Stem & Co., Inc. to prepare and certify
a balance sheet exhibiting the condition of its business as of Decem-
ber 31, 1923. To finance its operation, this company required extensive
credit and borrowed large sums of money from banks and other lenders.
All this was known to the defendants, who also knew that in the usual
course of business the balance sheet, when certified, would be exhib-
ited to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers and sellers, accord-
ing to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings. To
satisfy this purpose, the defendants supplied the Stern Company with
thirty-two copies of the certified balance sheet as counterpart originals.
The defendants did not know the persons to whom these would be
shown or the extent or number of the transactions in which they would
be used; in particular the accountants did not know that the balance
sheet would be submitted to the plaintiff. The balance sheet as certi-
fied showed a net worth of approximately 1,070,000 dollars. Attached
to the balance sheet was the accountants' certificate reading as follows:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the
year ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information
and explanations given us. We further certify that... the said state-
ment, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the financial
condition of Fred Stem & Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923....
In the month following the defendant's certification of the balance
sheet, Fred Stern & Co., Inc. approached the plaintiff for a loan. As
so 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
a1255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1153 (1931). This deci-
sion has produced a great deal of writing. See Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law
of Torts, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 372, 398-404 (1939); Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas &
Co.-Negligent Misrepresentations by Accountants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 477-78, (1951);
Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other Than His Client for Negligent Mis-
representation, Wis. L. REv. 371, 380-83 (1942); Rouse, Legal Liability of the Public
Accountant, 23 KY. L.J. 3 (1934); MacMillan, Sources & Extent of Liability of a Public
Accountant; 15 Cm.-Kr. L. REv. 1 (1936); and the following notes and comments:
19 CAziF. L. R v. 454 (1931); 31 CoLum. L. REv. 858 (1931); 16 Cozmq.r L.Q. 419
(1931); 33 ILL. L. Rev. 349 (1938); 26 ILL. L. REV. 49 (1931); 36 IowA L. Rev. 319,
322, (1951); 29 Mic. L. Rev. 648 (1931); 16 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 436 (1939); 13 ST. Jon's
L. Rev. 310 (1939); 6 U. Cma. L. Rev. 27 (1938).
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a condition to any loan, plaintiff insisted that it receive a balance sheet
certified by public accountants. The plaintiff was given one of the
certified balance sheets. In reliance upon the balance sheet and the
attached certificate signed by the defendants, the plaintiff advanced
to Fred Stern & Co., Inc. some 165,000 dollars. About ten months
thereafter, the company was declared bankrupt. It then appeared that
the balance sheet made by the defendants, showing a net worth of
approximately 1,070,000 dollars, was erroneous; the corporation at
that time was, in fact, insolvent. The assets had been overstated by
the defendants by the inclusion of over 706,000 dollars of fictitious
and non-existing accounts receivable. Had the facts been accurately
certified by the defendants, the plaintiff would not have made the loan.
The plaintiff alleged two causes of action, one based on fraud, the
other on negligence. The trial judge dismissed the fraud action, but
submitted the question of negligence to the jury.
On the question of negligence, the evidence was that the account-
ants had, prior to the actual audit, assigned a junior accountant the
task of posting accounts receivable and sales to the general ledger
from the sales journal. On the day the junior accountant finished post-
ing the December sales, totaling some 644,000 dollars, an employee
of the Stem Company posted additional December sales of some 706,-
000 dollars. These sales were entirely fictitious. When the junior ac-
countant resumed his work, he saw the entry thus added, and included
the 706,000 dollars of fictitious sales in his footings, resulting in an
overstatement of over 706,000 dollars in the assets of the business.
The auditors had failed to verify the 706,000 dollar ledger entry. An
examination would have disclosed that the entry in the ledger was
not supported by any entry in the sales journal. There were seven-
teen fictitious invoices supporting the entry, but scrutiny of these in-
voices would have disclosed that they were irregular. (They had no
shipping number or customer's order number and varied in terms of
credit and in other ways were unusual.) The defendants testified that
they did not remember whether they had inspected these invoices.
They conceded, however, that if they had looked, they would have
discovered the irregularities.
The auditors had grounds to suspect irregularities. The inventory
as it was given to the auditors totaled about 347,000 dollars. The de-
fendants discovered that it had been overstated and that the actual
inventory was but 44,000 dollars. Creditors had informed the defend-
ants that the same accounts receivable had been pledged to several
banks at the same time. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
in the amount of 187,576.32 dollars, whereupon the trial judge set aside
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the verdict. Plaintiff appealed to the appelate division which found
no fraud, but by a three to two decision reversed the dismissal of
negligence and reinstated the jury's verdict.3 2 The majority reasoned
that since it was customary for banks and merchants to require certi-
fied financial statements from independent accountants and to rely
upon these in making loans, accountants should owe a duty to these
banks and merchants to exercise due care. The court relied on the
Glanzer (bean weigher) case in support of its decision. In a dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Finch pointed out that the Glanzer case is inap-
plicable. In that case the identity of the person who was to be swayed
by the defendant's conduct was known in advance. In the instant
case, the defendants furnished the report without reference to any
particular person and had no knowledge of the person or class of
persons who might rely thereon, or of the specific purpose for which
the report might be used. Judge Finch feared the practical effect of
imposing liability on the accountants. Thus:
The professional man, be he accountant or otherwise, certifies for
his client and not for all the world. If the client makes it clear to
such a man that the statement is to be used in a particular transaction
in which a third party is involved, such circumstance should create a
duty from the professional man to such third party. If the accountant
is to be held to an unlimited liability to all persons who may act on
the faith of the certificate, the accountant would be obliged to pro-
tect himself by verification so rigid that its cost might well be pro-
hibitive and a limited but useful field of service thus closed to him.
The smallness of the compensation paid to the defendants for the
services requested is in striking contrast to the enormity of the lia-
bility now sought to be imposed upon them. If in the case at bar the
plaintiff had inquired of the accountants whether they might rely
upon the certificate in making a loan, then the accountants would
have the opportunity to gauge their responsibility and risk and deter-
mine with knowledge how thorough their verification of the account
should be before assuming the responsibility of making the certificate
run to the plaintiff.
3 3
The Ultramares case was then taken on cross appeals (plaintiff
appealing the dismissal of fraud; defendant appealing the finding of
negligence) to the New York Court of Appeals. This is the same court
which had previously held the automobile manufacturer liable in the
MacPherson case and the bean weigher liable in the Glanzer case.
Justice Cardozo who wrote the opinions in those cases also spoke for
32229 App. Div. 581, 243 N.Y. Supp. 179 (1st Dep't 1930), rev'd 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931); see the following note and comments. 30 CoLum. L. BEv. 1066
(1930); 44 HAnv. L. LEv. 134 (1930); 40 YALE L.J. 128 (1931).
33229 App. Div. 581, 587, 243 N.Y. Supp. 179, 186 (1st Dep't 1930), rev'd 255 N.Y.
170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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the court in Ultramares. The court had no trouble in finding the de-
fendants negligent, but the question was whether they owed a duty
to this particular plaintiff. Appalled at the breadth of liability urged
by the plaintiff, that any member of an indeterminate class of creditors
or investors, present and prospective, known and unknown, may hold
an accountant responsible for a negligent report, Justice Cardozo
wrote:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to
enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of
a duty that exposes to these consequences. 34
Glanzer was not overruled but merely distinguished on its facts:
In Glanzer v. Shepard, the seller of beans requested the defend-
ants, public weighers, to make return of the weight and funish the
buyer with a copy. This the defendants did.... The buyer paid the
seller on the faith of the certificate which turned out to be erroneous.
We held that the weighers were liable at the suit of the buyer for
the moneys overpaid. Here was something more than the rendition
of a service in the expectation that the one who ordered the certifi-
cate would use it thereafter in the operations of his business as occa-
sion might require. Here was a case where the transmission of the
certificate to another was not merely one possibility among many,
but the "end and aim of the transaction".... In a word, the service
rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for
the information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to
the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee.
In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit of the
Stem company ... and only incidentally or collaterally for the use
of those to whom Stem and his associates might exhibit it thereafter.3 5
This distinction between the Glanzer and Ultramares cases, that
the weigher's service was primarily for the benefit of the third party,
whereas in Ultramares the service was primarily for the benefit of the
client and only collaterally for that of lenders, has been criticized as
being artificial. The weight certificate in Glanzer was for the benefit
of the seller as well as for the benefit of the buyer; the audit report
in Ultramares of which there were thirty-two duplicate originals was
intended for the benefit of third parties as well as for the client.
3 6
34255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
35 Id. 182-83, 174 N.E. at 445-46.31 Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Hnv. L. REv. 372, 400
(1939).
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What is important is why recovery was denied in the Ultramares
case. In MacPherson a manufacturer places into the channels of com-
merce a negligently made car. A third party uses the car, is physically
harmed, and in an action against the manufacturer is granted recovery.
In Ultramares an accountant places into the channels of commerce
a negligently made audit report. A third party relies on the report,
is economically harmed, and in an action against the accountant is
denied recovery. In both cases the harm was foreseeable. Why is
there a difference in rules as to liability for conduct causing physical
harm and that causing only pecuniary harm? The answer rests on
policy.37 Justice Cardozo feared that an extension of liability for negli-
gent misrepresentation causing only pecuniary harm would subject
persons to a great and indeterminate liability. Therefore, the potential
liability of accountants was limited on the theory that liability would
have such a crushing effect on their profession that either they could
no longer offer such service, or their rates would be so high that people
could not afford to use their services, and in either case, the result
would be harmful to the economic interests of the community.38 It is
this possibility of liability of unknown extent which distinguishes the
Ultramares case from the Glanzer case, where the beans were mis-
weighed. 39 In Ultramares, the number and identity of persons who were
likely to rely upon the defendant's audit report was unknown, where-
as in Glanzer reliance on the weight certificate was known to be limited
to one identified party. In Glanzer the upper limit of liability was the
value of the beans. In Ultramares, the upper limit of liability was
indeterminate.4o
Although the Ultramares case set forth the policy that the scope
of liability should be more restricted in the case of economic loss than
where there is tangible harm to person or property, the point of limi-
tation has been a subject of considerable debate.41 The authors of the
Restatement of Torts have squarely faced this problem. Section 552,
apparently patterned after the New York cases of Glanzer and Ultra-
mares,42 states:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies informa-
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions is sub-
3 See Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrepresentation by
Accountants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 478 (1951).
38 Ibid.
39 Seavey, supra note 36 at 400.
40 Ibid. See also 36 IowA L. REv. 319, 326 (1951).
41 PRossER, ToRTs 543 (2d ed. 1955).
42 See CALuOIxA ANNOTATIONS TO TaE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAV OF TORTS,
§ 552 (1957); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 126,
331 P.2d 74-2, 747 (1958).
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ject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the
information if (a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in
obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient
is justified in expecting, and (b) the harm is suffered (i) by the per-
son or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the information
was supplied, and (ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a
transaction in which it was intended to influence his conduct or in a
transaction substantially identical therewith.
43
Applying this section to accountants, it appears that the account-
ants' scope of duty extends to those persons for whose guidance the
accountant prepares his report and for those transactions in which
the report was intended to be used.
Although there are no cases reported in California involving a
third party action against an accountant, a recent decision involving
an abstractor of title approved section 552 of the Restatement as well
as the rationale of the Ultramares case.
44
Curiously, cases involving negligent misrepresentations by account-
ants arising after the Ultramares case have ignored the Glanzer case,
and interpreted the Ultramares case as ruling that accountants are not
liable to third parties for ordinary negligence. Instead of analyzing
the cases in terms of duty, that is whether the accountant's scope of
duty extends to the particular plaintiff, the courts have accepted the
Ultramares decision as holding that accountants owe no duty to per-
sons not in privity.45 This interpretation has even been applied in cases
43 RSTATEm=Tr, ToRTs, § 552 (1938).
44 Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742
(1958). The case held that a title company which negligently searched title of AXs
property, owed no duty of care to B, a remote purchaser, not in privity, who purchased
the property from A ten years later. In Howell v. Betts, 362 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. 1962),
the issue was whether the defendant, who negligently surveyed a lot for the then owner,
owed a duty to a purchaser, not in privity, who purchased the lot 24 years later in re-
liance on his survey. The court recognized the Biakania case as repudiating the privity
doctrine, but denied recovery under the rationale of the Ultramares case, on the grounds
that if the surveyor could be held liable to a remote purchaser 24 years after his survey,
then with equal reason, he could be held liable to any and all purchasers to the end
of time.
Although it may be necessary to confine title abstractors' and surveyors' scope of
duty so that they will not be liable for an indeterminate time, this time factor would
not be as important in accounting cases. Whereas a survey or title search made many
years ago may be relied on today, financial statements lose their utility with the passage
of time.
See also De Zemplen v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 221 A.C.A. 236, 34
Cal. Rptr. 334, 339 (1963) (approving § 552 of the REsTATaEznmNr, ToRvrs).
45 In O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (1937), the court said "Since there was
no contractual relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, liability could be
imposed only for fraud. . ."; in 54 A.L.R.2d 324, 345 (1957), the author of an annota-
tion entitled Liability of Public Accountant, states "public accountants may not be
found liable upon the theory of ordinary negligence to parties with whom they are not
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where the facts are similar to those of the Glanzer case, i.e., negligent
misrepresentation to a known third party for a specific transaction.
Thus, in an English case, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.,
46
the accountants, during the course of preparing a balance sheet for
their client, were told by the client to exhibit it to a prospective investor
when completed. This the accountants did. In reliance thereon, the
investor purchased an interest in the company. The company became
insolvent, and it was then learned the accountants were "extremely
careless" in the preparation of the balance sheet. The plaintiff sued
the accountants for negligence. Bound by English precedents,47 the
court, in a two to one decision, held that the accountants were not
liable for negligent misrepresentation to anyone other than their client.
The English court did not consider the Glanzer case, but cited the
Ultramares case to support its decision of no liability. Professor Seavey
has stated that this is an erroneous use of the Ultramares decision,
that if an American case was to be used, it should have been the Glanzer
case where the reasoning would support liability.
48
Apparently the first American case involving a negligent misrep-
resentation by an accountant to a definite party for a definite purpose
was Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen.49 A and B owned all the stock of
a corporation. A agreed to purchase B's stock at a price dependent
upon the results of an audit. The corporation employed a certified
public accountant (B's brother-in-law) to make the audit. The ac-
countant performed the audit negligently with the result that A over-
paid for the shares. The court held that the accountant was negligent
but found no liability, that under the rule of Ultramares, an accountant
is not liable to a third party for ordinary negligence.
In the area of accountants' malpractice cases, some courts have thus
shown a tendency to assume that the Ultramares case was intended to
insulate accountants from third party liability. All that should be de-
duced from Ultramares is that in the particular circumstances of that
in privity." There is one possible exception. In C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224
F.2d 44, 46 (1955), the court in dicta stated that it approved the jury instruction that
"in order to establish a duty to the plaintiff for ordinary negligence in preparation of
the .. .audits, the jury had to find that these reports had been made for the 'primary
benefit' of the plaintiff."
46 [1951] 2 K.B. 164; Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Mis-
representation by Accountants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466 (1951); 6 RuTOms L. Rtv. 478
(1952); 65 HAnv. L. Rtv. 355 (1951).
47 Le Lievre & Dennes v. Gould, [1893] Q.B. 491; Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 A.C.
337.
48 Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrepresentation by Ac-
countants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 478 (1951).
49 131 N.Y.S.2d 20, aff'd without opinion, 285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829
(1954).
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case there was no duty owing the third party; the accountants' scope
of duty was limited so that accountants would not be exposed to a
potentially unlimited liability. The scope of the accountant's duty
(which is limited) should not be confused with the basis of liability
(i.e., negligence). A rule that accountants owe a duty to no one but
their clients was criticized by Lord Denning in his dissenting opinion
to Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. as not serving the best interests
of the financial community. 50 To illustrate, he posed an example where
the client is dishonest and intentionally supplies the accountants with
erroneous information hoping they accept it without verification. This
they do. As a result the accountants negligently misrepresent their
client's financial condition. The client will not complain. The creditors
and investors who are harmed cannot complain because the law says
auditors owe no duty to them. The auditor's opinion "which should
be a safeguard, becomes a snare for those who rely on it."51
Lord Denning concluded that the accountants' duty should extend
to any third party to whom he has authorized his client to show the
report but only for those transactions for which to the accountant's
knowledge his report is required.
Some writers have argued that the duty of accountants should
extend much farther. They have challenged the premise that the scope
of liability for conduct causing economic loss should be more limited
than the scope of liability for conduct causing tangible harm to person
or property.52 It has been argued that the reckless writer should be
held to as high a standard as the reckless driver, "for his pen may im-
poverish thousands, while his car can hurt but few."53 In reference
to accountants, it has been argued that the duty of care should extend
to the foreseeable plaintiff, as in negligence law generally, because
(1) public accountancy by economic necessity amounts to a "public
calling," 4 (2) third parties are virtually forced to rely on the account-
50 [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 184.
51 Ibid. at 185.
52 Supra note 48 at 473.
53 Hitz, J., dissenting in New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Hutton, 71 F.2d 989,
996 states:
"[T]here can be no controlling difference between damage to the person
and damage to the purse."
A man occupying an influential position in modem business by his false
statements may affect the welfare of many persons whom he never sees or who
never hear his voice and he should be held at least to as high a measure of
responsibility for his reckless pen as for his negligent motorcar.
For his pen may impoverish thousands, while his car can hurt but few.
5 4 Rouse, Legal Liability of the Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L.J. 3, 54 (1934); 19
CAX..m. L. REv. 454, 456 (1931); 16 CORNELL L.Q. 419, 426 (1931); 13 ST. Jom's L.
REv. 310, 313 (1939); 40 YAix L.J. 128, 129 (1930); see also Arteburn, The Origin &
First Tests of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411 (1927).
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ant's report because of the difficulty of independently checking his
work,55 (3) reliance by the third parties is justifiable.5 6 Finally, it has
been pointed out that Justice Cardozo's fear of the solvency of the
accounting profession is unwarranted. Under the Securities and Ex-
change Act, accountants have a broad liability to third parties.57 Fur-
ther, accountants may (1) qualify their opinion,58 and thus limit
responsibility, or (2) take out liability insurance.5 9 For an accountant
to qualify his report, when he otherwise believes he has fairly stated
it, is impractical. A qualification correspondingly reduces its utility.
As to the purchase of liability insurance, how much should the account-
ant carry? It was the fear of a possible liability of unknown extent
that led to a denial of negligence liability in the Ultramares case. If
the upper limit of liability is indefinite, complete protection would
appear unobtainable, or at least too costly.
Liability to Third Parties for Deceit
If an accountant, in performing an audit, is not merely negligent,
but is also guilty of a fraudulent misrepresentation in respect to his
clients' financial condition, can a third party who is injured by his
reliance upon that misrepresentation (and unable to recover on a
theory of negligence) recover on a theory of deceit? What is the
accountants' scope of liability for deceit, and is it broader than that
for negligence? 0 But first, what constitutes deceit?
55 65 HA~v. L. REv. 355, 356 (1951).
56 Note, 36 IowA L. REv. 319, 326 (1951): "It would seem to be grossly unjust,
even ridiculous, to exonerate a firm whose sole purpose in preparing a balance sheet
was to provide prospective investors with information . . . because too many people
placed too much trust and confidence in the quality of their service." Note, 31 CoLum.
L. Ray. 858, 869 (1931): "The accountant is left in a situation in which he requests
reliance, demands a premium for his certification because of the reliance which it induces,
and then seeks to avoid liability arising from the reliance."
57 After the passage of the Act it was said: "To say the least the Act goes as far in
protection of purchasers of securities as plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccess-
fully urged the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a creditor. The
change which that court thought so 'revolutionary' as to be 'wrought by legislation
has been made." Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YAI.X L.J.
171, 198 (1933).
58 Note, 31 CoLum. L. lEv. 858, 869 (1931).
59 Note, 36 IowA L. REv. 319, 327 (1951).
60 See generally Puosszn, TORTS 536-50 (2d ed. 1955); 1 HARPra & J~mas, TORTS
527-59 (1956); Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HAnv. L. Rav. 184 (1900);
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARv. L. REv. 415 (1911); Bohlen,
Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HAJv. L. REv. 733 (1929);
Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24
ILL. L. REv. 749 (1930); Harper & McNealy, A Synthesis of the Law of Misrepresenta-
tion; 22 MINN. L. REv. 939 (1938); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. Rav. 749 (1930); Keeton,
The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representors Responsibility, 17 TExAs L. REv. 1 (1938);
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In the leading case on deceit, Derry v. Peek,61 the defendants, who
were directors of a tramway corporation, issued a prospectus to induce
the public to subscribe for stock, which contained the statement that
the company had the right "to use steam or mechanical motive power,
instead of horses .... ." In fact the company had no such right. The
trial judge found as a fact that the defendants honestly believed the
truth of their statement and therefore held there was no deceit. The
intermediate court reversed.6 2 It held that although the defendants
might honestly have believed the truth of their statement, they had
no reasonable ground for any such belief and since they ought to have
known the statement was false, they are liable in deceit. The House
of Lords reversed the intermediate court and held that an honest
belief was a defense to an action in deceit, no matter how unreasonable
the grounds for the belief. For deceit, the court stated there must be
proof that a "false representation has been made (1) knowingly, or
(2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it
be true or false."63 The court suggested, however, that negligence,
although not a substitute for deceit, may nevertheless be evidence
that the defendant did not have an "honest belief" in the truth of his
assertion.
This decision, which identified the deceit action with intentional
misrepresentation, and excluded from the action a negligent or inno-
cent misrepresentation, has been followed in the United States by a
large number of courts.64
A minority of American jurisdictions has modified the Derry v. Peek
formula and has extended the action of deceit to (1) negligent mis-
representations, and/or (2) innocent misrepresentations.0 5
In California, by statute, negligent misrepresentation is a form of
deceit.6 6 Thus in California where the defendant makes false state-
Seavey, Caveat Emptor of 1960, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 439 (1960); Keeton, Fraud: The
Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583 (1958); Note, 21 MnqN. L.
REv. 434 (1937).
61 [1889] 14 A.C. 337 (reversing the intermediate court and affirming the trial
court).
62 Peek v. Derry, [1888] 37 Ch. Div. 541.
, [1889] 14 A.C. 337, 374.
64 Pnossmn, TORTS 537 (2d ed. 1955); Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negli-
gence, or Warranty, 42 HAnv. L. REv. 733, 734-35 (1929).
65 Bohlen, supra note 64 at 735-37, 743.
66 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1710(2): "The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true,
by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true." CAL. CrV. CODE
§ 1572(2): "The positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of
the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true." Similar
or same provisions have been adopted in Montana, MONT. BEv. CODE § 13-308, North
Dakota, N.D. REv. CODE § 9-03-08, South Dakota, S.D. REv. CODE § 10-0307, and Okla-
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ments, honestly believing they are true, but without reasonable grounds
for such belief, he is liable in deceit. Some jurisdictions apply a rule
that where the speaker makes a statement of fact true to his own
knowledge, he warrants the accuracy of his statement. If the state-
ment is false, he is liable in deceit, notwithstanding his belief in the
truth of the statement is both honest and reasonable.
6
7
How has the law of deceit been applied to accounting practice?
In Ultramares68 the court pointed out that the accountant's certi-
ficate consisted of two sentences. The first sentence contained state-
ments of fact. The second sentence contained a statement of opinion.
The first sentence read as follows:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stem & Co., Inc. for the
year ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information
and explanations given us.
The court stated in reference to this portion of the auditor's certificate:
The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that
the balance sheet was in accordance with the books of account. If
their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated because they
believed it to be true.... [A]ccountants ... by the very nature of
their calling profess to speak with knowledge when certifying to an
agreement between the audit and the entries.
69
The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which
the jury might hold such a statement to be false. Commentators are
of the opinion that the court here applied the doctrine that one making
a statement of fact true to his own knowledge warrants the accuracy
of his statement, that neither honest belief in the truth nor reasonable
care will constitute a defense. 70 Admittedly, such expression that "they
homa, 15 OxL-STAT. § 58.
In California a plaintiff has two possible theories of recovery in an action for negli-
gent misrepresentation. He may bring an action in negligence or in deceit. See Gagne
v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487-90, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954). Apparently the scope of
liability for negligent misrepresentations is the same whether the action is brought in
negligence or deceit. For cases discussing the scope of liability for negligent misrepre-
sentations, see Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 128,
331 P.2d 742 (1962); De Zemplen v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 221 A.C.A.
236, 34 Cal. Rptr. 334, 339 (1963).
67 Bohlen, supra note 64 at 735-57, 743.
6s 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
69 Id. at 189; 174 N.E. at 448-49.
70 Meek, Liability of Accountant to Parties Other Than His Employer for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 17 Wisc. L. REv. 371, 376-78 (1942); LxvY, AccourTANs' LEGAL
REsPoNsimLITY 74 (1959). For a general discussion of the doctrine that one who states
a fact to be true to his own knowledge is liable, if the statement is false, see Williston,
Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HAv. L. R1v. 415 (1911); Bohlen, Misrepre-
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are not to be exonerated because they believed it to be true" taken
completely out of context supports the conclusion that the court in-
tended to impose liability for an innocent misrepresentation. An entire
reading of the opinion, however, suggests that the court merely held
that there was sufficient evidence to entitle a jury to find that when
the accountants made the positive and unqualified representation that
the balance sheet corresponded with the accounts, they were doubtful
about the truth of such statement because they consciously realized
that their audit was not adequate to justify making such assertion
with certainty.71 This is fraud within, not an exception, to the rule of
Derry v. Peek, as one who is doubtful of the truth of his statements
cannot be said to have an "honest belief" in their truth.7 2 The account-
ants may have believed there was correspondence between the bal-
ance sheet and the books, but a mere belief or opinion as to the exist-
ence of a fact did not justify stating that the fact positively existed
as of their own knowledge. Fraud consists of the representer mis-
stating his state of mind. When one is conscious that he merely
believes a thing to exist-but is not positive-and he chooses to say
sentation, as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HAav. L. Esv. 733 (1929); Keeton,
Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 583 (1958); Carpenter,
Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L.
11Ev. 749 (1930); 1 HARPEa & JAMws, ToRTs 535, 551 (1956).
The accounting profession, as a result of the Ultramares case, has changed the
wording of its certificates. Accountants no longer state as a fact the result of the exami-
nation (i.e., that the balance sheet is in accordance with the accounts), but state the
results in the form of an opinion. The word "certify" is no longer used. The certificate
now generally used by the profession reads as follows:
We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of June 30, 19-
and the related statement(s) of income and retained earnings for the year then
ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted audit-
ing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and
such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statement(s) of in-
come and retained earnings present fairly the financial position of X Company
at June 30, 19-, and the results of its operations for the year then ended, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis
consistent with that of the preceding year.
In the proper circumstances, California may impose liability for an innocent mis-
representation. California considered the warranty theory (but held it inapplicable
under the circumstances) in the recent case of Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 486,
275 P.2d 15, 19 (1954): "Strict liability has also been imposed for innocent misrepre-
sentation of facts that the maker purported to know, that the recipient relied on in
matters affecting his economic interests, and that the maker positively affimed under
circumstances that justify the conclusion that he assumed responsibility for their
accuracy."
71 See generally Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 U.C.L.A.L.
1Ev. 583 (1958); Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HAav. L. 1Ev.
415, 430-34 (1911).
72 1 HARPER & JAM s, TORTS 534 (1956).
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that he positively knows the thing to exist, he is really asserting what
is false and thereby intentionally misleads him to whom the informa-
tion is given.7
3
It is not clear whether the court intended to apply the doctrine
that one who positively states a fact as of his own knowledge is liable,
if the statement is false, irrespective of an honest belief in its truth.74
An accountant, however, to protect himself, should, whenever he relies
upon sources of knowledge other than his own, so state in his report.75
73 Bohlen, supra note 64 at 738.
74 It has been observed that in this area of the law of fraud, there is considerable
amount of confusion and that courts and commentators have given different interpreta-
tions to ambiguous statements which are found in many of the judicial opinions. See
Keeton, supra note 71 at 583. Thus, the opinion in the Ultramares case cited Hadcock
v. Osmer, 153 N.Y. 604, 47 N.E. 923 (1897), as authority for the rule that one who makes
an unqualified statement of fact as of his own knowledge is liable if the statement is
false. The Hadcock case has been interpreted by Williston, supra note 71 at 433 n.51,
for the proposition that making a statement as of actual knowledge may amount to fraud
only when the defendant not only does not know the truth of what he asserts, but is
conscious that he does not know it. Pnossan op. cit. supra note 60 at 538 n.65 is in
accord with Williston. However, 1 HARPER & JAmEs op. cit. supra note 72 at 535 n.15,
552 n.3, cites the case as an example of innocent misrepresentation, that if the defend-
ant makes a statement as true to his own knowledge, he is liable if it is false, irrespec-
tive of an honest belief in the truth of the statement.
75 Thus in Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934), the aud-
itors' certificate stated: "We hereby certify that we have examined the books of account
and record of International Match Corporation and its American Subsidiary . . . and
have received statements from abroad with respect to the foreign constituent companies.
... Based upon our examination and information submitted to us it is our opinion that
the annexed Consolidated Balance Sheet sets forth the financial condition of the com-
bined companies. .... " It appeared that the plaintiff had purchased stocks and bonds
in the International Match Corporation in reliance on the auditors' certified balance
sheet. It was later discovered that the corporation was bankrupt at the time of plain-
tiff's purchase. The plaintiff brought an action against the accountant for fraudulent
misrepresentations, which, however, were confined to the statements received from
abroad. The court distinguished Ultramares on the ground that there the accountants
in certifying correspondence between the balance sheet and the books made a state-
ment as true to their own knowledge when in fact they had no such knowledge. In the
instant case, however, the accountants fully disclosed that their opinion was based on
statements received from abroad, which gives rise to an indisputable inference that
they had not examined the records of the foreign companies, and thus could not have
known whether or not the statements were accurate. Accordingly there was no pre-
tense of knowledge as to the information received which could make the defendants
liable for fraud.
In C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (1955), it was charged that the
accountants overstated the value of receivables. It appeared that the valuation of the
receivables was dependent on the valuation of the collateral securing them, which was
extremely difficult to make due to the nature of the business. The accountants relied
heavily on the valuation of the collateral made by their client and in their audit report
disclosed this reliance by inserting a disclaimer of responsibility as to the valuation of
the collateral and receivables. The jury's verdict exonerating the accountants was affirmed.
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In the second sentence of their certificate, the auditors stated their
opinion:
We further certify that... the said statement, in our opinion, pre-
sents a true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern
& Co., Inc., as at December 31, 1923.
As to an expert's opinion, the court held there is fraud if the grounds
supporting the opinion "are so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that
there was no genuine belief back of it."70 Further, negligence, although
not a substitute for fraud, "is none the less evidence to sustain an
inference of fraud."77 The court concluded that the jury might find
from the evidence presented that the accountants had not a "sincere
or genuine belief when they certified to an opinion that the balance
sheet faithfully reflected the condition of the business." 78 The court
reversed the dismissal of the cause of action in fraud and granted a
new trial.
The Ultramares decision is significant in its enlargement of the
scope of liability for deceit.79 Under the traditional and English view, 0
adopted by the Restatement of Torts,81 liability is limited to only those
persons in whom the defendant intended to induce reliance and then
only to those who rely in the manner intended. In Ultramares a broader
rule was applied; the plaintiff who relies on the misrepresentation does
not have to show that the defendant intended to induce his reliance,
it is enough that the defendant should reasonably have foreseen this
possibility.8 2
76255 N.Y. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447.
77 Id. at 191, 174 N.E. at 449.
78 Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at 449.
79 Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HAnv. L. REv. 372,
402-04 (1939).
8 0 Peek v. Gurney, [1873] L.R. 6 H.L. 377, is the leading case in the ambit of
fraudulent representor's liability. The directors of a corporation issued a fraudulent
prospectus for the purpose of inducing the public to purchase stock from the company.
An investor who relied on the prospectus and purchased the shares, not from the com-
pany, but on the market from a stockholder, was denied recovery. The holding was based
on a rule that a representor is liable only to those whom he had desired to influence,
in the manner which had occasioned the injury. For a discussion of this rule, see
PaossEn, ToRTS 539 (2d ed. 1955), Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's
Liability, 17 TEXAs L. REV. 1, 5 (1938).
81 Section 531, with some limitations in §§ 532 (documents), 536 (information
required by statute). Section 531, comment a, contains an illustration: "1. A is selling
securities to B in the presence of C. A should but does not realize that C might rely
upon As statement to B and purchase some securities on his own account. This occurs.
A is not liable to C." See also § 533.
82 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Atherton, 47 N.M. 443, 449, 144 P.2d
157, 161 (1944); PRossER, ToRTs 541 (2d ed. 1955); Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960,
38 TEXAS L. REv. 439, 440, n.6 (1960); 36 IowA L. REv. 319, 321 (1951).
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In Ultramares the court thus drew a distinction between the scope
of liability for negligence and for deceit. Liability for deceit (but not
for negligence) was extended to any member of an indeterminate
class whose reliance upon the accountants' report was foreseeable.
The reason for this difference in scope of liability is a matter of policy:
the liability of the intentional wrongdoer should be greater than that
of the negligent wrongdoer.8 3
California, however, apparently does not follow this broad rule
in defining the boundaries of liability for deceit, but follows the tradi-
tional and narrower English rule, as expressed in the Restatement of
Torts.14 Under this narrower rule, if a firm of accountants employed
to audit the books of a corporation gives a report fraudulently mis-
representing its assets, it is not liable in fraud to whomever the corpo-
ration may exhibit the report unless the accountants furnished the
report with the intent that it be communicated to the plaintiff in order
to influence his conduct in a particular transaction. 5 This limitation
of liability to those whom the defendant intended to influence appears
too narrow,"6 and can be defended only from a purely historical view-
point.87 If a court were to apply this narrower view as to the scope
of liability for deceit, a plaintiff, such as the one in Ultramares, would
be entirely without a remedy.88
83 Keeton, supra note 80 at 4; Seavey, supra note 79 at 404.
84 Cohen v. Citizens Natl Trust & Say. Bank, 143 Cal. App. 2d 480, 484, 300 P.2d
14, 17-18 (1956): "A person uttering misrepresentations is liable only to those in whom
he intended to induce reliance and who do rely in the manner intended .... Even
though the misrepresentation has been made directly to the plaintiff, if the facts clearly
indicate that the defendant when making such misstatements had no intention of in-
ducing reliance by his listener, there is no actionable fraud even though the hearer in
fact relies to his detriment .... " See also 2 WrrmN, SvmmAny or CAL.omwrA LAw
Torts §§ 199-200, 207-08 (1960); CALioRNrA ANNOTATIONS TO THE lESTATEmENT OF
TORTS, §§ 531, 533 (1957).
85 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 533 (1938); CALwoa nr ANNOTATIONS TO THE
lESTATEmiENT OF TORTS § 533 (1957).
86 PossER, TORTS 541 (2d ed. 1955); Seavey, supra note 79 at 404; 48 YAr L.J.
390 (1939); 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 20 (1939).
87 Historically, the conscious defrauder has been, and in many courts still is, treated
more leniently than other wrongdoers. This negative attitude towards deceit is traceable
to medieval England when the accepted standards of business morality could be ex-
pressed in two words: "caveat emptor." Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TMCAS L.
REv. 439 (1960); Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 Hcav. L. REv.
372, 402-04 (1939).
88 In California the scope of liability for a negligent misrepresentation causing
economic harm appears to be coincident with the scope of liability for deceit (whether
based upon intentional or negligent misrepresentations). This is attributable to the fact
that California follows the Restatement of Torts, §§ 533 (scope of liability for deceit)
and 552 (scope of liability for negligent supplier of business information), which are
substantially the same with respect to scope of liability.
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The principles stated in Ultramares, that an expression of opinion
may be a fraudulent representation if there is not an honest belief in
that opinion, that fraud may be inferred from negligence, are in accord
with the Derry v. Peek rule. The decision indicates that if account-
ants are doubtful or skeptical of the validity of their opinion, because
they realize it is based on insufficient or inadequate investigation of
the underlying data, they do not entertain an "honest belief." An inter-
esting application of these principles occurred in the case of State
Street Trust Co. v. Ernst 9 On January 19, 1929, the president of Pelz-
Greenstein applied to plaintiff, a trust company, for a line of credit
and a time loan of 300,000 dollars. He presented an estimated balance
sheet (unaudited) of the business as of December 31, 1928, and stated
that defendants, a firm of accountants, were making an audit of the
condition of the company as of that date and that a balance sheet
certified by the defendants would be submitted to plaintiff when it
had been prepared. The plaintiff refused to grant a time loan until
it had received the certified financial statements and had found that
it substantially corroborated the estimated balance sheet. However,
pending the receipt of the certified financial statements, the plaintiff
made a demand loan to Pelz-Greenstein of the requested 300,000
dollars. The certified balance sheet was prepared by the accountants
and, with ten copies, was furnished to the client. Pelz-Greenstein
forwarded one of the copies to the plaintiff. The accountants knew
that the copies would be used to obtain credit. Having found that
the certified balance sheet substantially corroborated the estimated
balance sheet, the plaintiff cancelled the demand note and issued a
three months' time note in its place. This note was renewed several
times for like three month periods.
Thirty days after the plaintiff received the certified balance sheet
(and after the time loan had been made), the accountants sent to their
client-and only to their client-a long-form report containing com-
ments and explanations of the balance sheet which did not appear on
the condensed report previously distributed.
One year after the plaintiff made its loan the corporation was
petitioned into bankruptcy. It was then discovered that the certified
balance sheet prepared by the defendants, which showed assets of
8,000,000 dollars, liabilities of about 5,000,000 dollars, and net worth
of about 3,000,000 dollars was erroneous. In fact the corporation was
insolvent; its liabilities exceeded the fair value of its assets.
There was no question that the officers of the corporation had been
deliberately dishonest; they made old and probably uncollectible ac-
89278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
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counts appear good by causing payments to be made to Pelz-Green-
stein, Inc. by another corporation owned by themselves. (This made
it appear as if the debtors had been paying their debts.) Plaintiff's
complaint was based on allegations of fraud, alleging that many items
in the balance sheet were fraudulently misrepresented. Basically it
was claimed that the company's receivables were grossly overvalued.
A block of receivables was valued at 2,000,000 dollars (representing
25 per cent of the company's assets) without disclosure that over
768,000 dollars of these accounts were stagnant. The accountants in-
formed their client of the inactive condition of these accounts in their
long-form report. Another block of receivables was valued at 215,125
dollars although the books showed on their face that many of these
accounts had been inactive for years. The accountants also informed
their client of the condition of these accounts in the long-form report.
The accountants attempted to justify their action as to these latter
accounts on the ground that the company's treasurer informed them
that these accounts were amply secured.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in the trial court, the de-
fendants moved to dismiss. The judge reserved decision on this motion
whereupon the defendants rested without calling any witnesses. The
case was submitted to the jury which found for the plaintiff. The trial
judge set aside the verdict, and directed a verdict for the defendants.
The appellate division unanimously affirmed. The court of appeals in
a four to two decision reversed and granted a new trial, holding that
as a matter of law, the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to enable
the jury to find that the defendants were grossly negligent, from which
they could infer fraud.
The court of appeals speaking through Judge Finch reiterated
principles laid down in the Ultramares case, which it stated as follows:
Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, even where
there is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A representation certified
as true to the knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there
is none, a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on grounds so
flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that there was no genuine belief
in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal
to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently
gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud.... In
other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequences may
take the place of deliberate intention. 0
The court concluded that there was abundant evidence from which
a jury could find that the defendants knew facts which vitally affected
the financial worth of their client and which the defendants concealed
90 Id. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 418-19.
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on the condensed balance sheet, but disclosed to their client alone
in the long-form report. From this evidence, the jury might reason-
ably have drawn the inference that the accountants had no genuine
belief in the figures in the condensed balance sheet to which they
certified.
The court was disturbed by the fact that the accountants accepted
the client's statement that certain of the receivables were amply secured
without any verification:
[It appeared on the face of the books that there had been no realiza-
tion upon this security for years .... If an accountant may disregard
a situation which indicates substantial losses because he is informed
by the person whose books are being examined that there is adequate
security, the balance sheet issued by the accountant, by its failure to
point this out, contains a misrepresentation. The very purpose of the
bank in seeking the balance sheet prepared by the accountant is to
check any possible fraud on the part of the person seeking the loan.9'
But the court seemed most disturbed by the fact that the account-
ants issued two reports, a condensed one for distribution to creditors
containing an unqualified opinion, and a long-form one issued only
to their client explaining the items in the condensed report.
These accountants ... sent to Pelz-Greenstein the certified balance
sheet, with ten additional copies, knowing that it was to be used to
obtain credit.... Not until thirty days later did the accountants send
to Pelz-Greenstein a letter of explanation of this balance sheet, and
then apparently only one copy. So important was this covering letter
in the minds of defendants that, although the balance sheet attached
to the covering letter was in other respects substantially identical
with the original balance sheet, it contained the following notation,
which did not appear at all on the original balance sheet released
thirty days earlier: "This balance sheet is subject to the comments
contained in the letter attached to and made a part of this report"...
The above act of the accountants ... was itself gross negligence
and an important piece of evidence raising an inference of fraud. 2
The court also was unimpressed with the fact that the defendant
did not call any witness "although there would naturally be available
the men who prepared or supervised the preparation of the working
papers or the certified balance sheet and experts to refute the testimony
offered by the experts called by the plaintiff."93
The State Street case demonstrates (1) the coexistence of a
condensed report and long-form report is dangerous from an eviden-
tiary standpoint- (2) information supplied by the client should be
91 Id. at 118-19, 15 N.E.2d at 421-22.
91 Id. at 113-14, 15 N.E.2d at 419-20.
03 Id. at 111, 15 N.E.2d at 418.
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independently verified; (3) from an evidentiary standpoint, defend-
ant-accountants should take the stand and defend their work.
Liability Under Federal and State Legislation
Federal Statutes
The common law liability of accountants to third parties for negli-
gence has been substantially expanded by the enactment of the Fed-
eral Securities Act of 1933. 94 This act regulates the offering of securi-
ties for sale to the public through the use of the mails or in interstate
commerce. Its main purpose is to insure that significant facts about
a security are made available to investors. The act requires the public
filing of a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the delivery to each prospective investor of a pros-
pectus which contains most of the data incorporated in the registra-
tion statement. Included in the registration statements are the rele-
vant financial statements of the issuer of the securities, which are
required to be certified by independent public accountants (usually
certified public accountants). The act provides that if any part of the
financial statements contained in the registration statement (1) con-
tains an untrue statement of a material fact or (2) omits a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, the purchaser of the security may sue the
accountant.95 The plaintiff does not have to prove (1) that the account-
ant was negligent or fraudulent in certifying the financial statements
involved, (2) or that he relied upon the statement (or even read it),
(3) or that the loss suffered was the proximate result of the false state-
ment.96 Once the plaintiff has established the falsity or misleading
character of the financial statements, the burden of proving lack of
negligence or fraud is shifted to the accountant. The accountant to
escape liability must prove that he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe that the financial state-
ments to which he certified, were true.97
9448 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77 (1934).
95 48 Stat. 82, 15 U.S.C. 77k (1934).
06 These provisions have been justified by the assumption that the price of a security
in the open market is affected by the contents of the registration statement, and that
therefore in the event of a material error in the statement, any purchaser is at least
indirectly damaged, whether or not he has read or relied upon the statement. Further,
it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove that the loss was attributable to the mis-
representation in the financial statement, to the exclusion of the innumerable causes
of price fluctuation. See Douglas & Bates, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J.
171, 174 (1933).
97 48 Stat. 82, 15 U.S.C. 77k (1934).
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The Securities Act of 1933 relates only to initial offerings of securi-
ties. A more recent statute, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,98
relates generally to the regulation of securities traded on the securi-
ties exchanges. It provides for the filing of annual reports with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, including financial statements
certified by independent public accountants. The liability of the ac-
countant for misleading or false statements is not as broad as in the
1933 Act. The plaintiff must prove his reliance upon the financial
statement and prove damages that were caused by such reliance. The
accountant is given the statutory defense "that he acted in good faith
and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."99
Thus, it appears that the plaintiff must prove "scienter."
The civil remedies under the Federal Securities Act do not apply
to creditors other than bondholders. Very few cases against account-
ants have been reported under the Federal Securities Acts. 00
State Statute
Under the authority of the Business and Professions Code, 10 the
California State Board of Accountancy enacted a rule of professional
conduct which provides in part:
58. Expressing Opinions. (a) Whenever a certified public account-
ant or public accountant allows his name to be associated with finan-
cial statements he shall do one of the following:
(1) Express an unqualified opinion;
(2) Express a qualified opinion;
(3) Disclaim an opinion on the statements taken as a whole;
(4) Disclose that the statements have been prepared without
audit.
(b) In order to express an unqualified opinion a certified public
accountant or public accountant shall acquire, by the application of
the necessary auditing procedures, in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards, sufficient information to warrant such
opinion.... .2
If an accountant through carelessness violates rule 58, does this con-
stitute negligence "per se" of the character that would permit an
98 48 Stat. 881,15 U.S.C. 78 (1934).
go 48 Stat. 897, 15 U.S.C. 78r (1934).
100 See Shouts v. Hirliman, 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939); H. L. Green Co. v.
Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. N.Y., 1960).
For detailed regulations relating to the accountants' certification of financial state-
ments and their required form and content, see 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1949).
For a general discussion of accountants' liability under the federal securities acts,
see RAPPAPORT, S.E.C. ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ch. 23 (1963); Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1722-27, 1732-34, 1864-65 (1961).
101 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5010, 5018.
102 16 CAL. ADm. CoDE § 58 (as amended 1961).
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injured third-party lender or investor to recover from the accountant?
It is established law that the violation of a statute or ordinance con-
stitutes negligence as a matter of law, or "per se," if there is no legally
sufficient justification, if the person harmed is a member of the class
intended to be protected by the particular regulation and if the harm
is of the kind the applicable regulation is designed to prevent 103 For
whose benefit was rule 58 enacted? The statutory authority under
which rule 58 was enacted provides that the California State Board
of Accountancy may "by regulation, prescribe, amend or repeal rules
of professional conduct appropriate to the establishment and mainte-
nance of a high standard of integrity and dignity in the profession."'0 4
Thus, it appears that the legislative intent was primarily to benefit
the accountants as a professional class by establishing the highest
standards of conduct for their members. There are indications, how-
ever, that the specific intent behind rule 58 may have been to benefit
the lending or investing public. The State of California's Department
and Professional Standards has stated that:10 5
The purpose of Rule 58 is to enable credit grantors, stockholders,
and others who receive financial statements to determine the extent
to which they may be relied upon. 06
And:
In addition to helping public readers of financial statements, com-
pliance with Rule 58 will also aid the licensee. Such compliance will
limit his civil liability because he will have given a clear-cut, defini-
tive disclosure as to the scope of his examination .... 107
The question remains: does rule 58 enlarge the scope of the account-
ants' liability to third parties? 08
Conclusions
If an accountant, in performing an audit for his client, misrepre-
sents the latter's financial condition, a third party who is economically
10335 CAL. Jun. 2d Negligence § 16 (1957).
1
0 4 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5018.
10 5 CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PROFESSIONAL & VOCATIONAL STAiNDARs, NoTicE To
LICENSEES CONCERNING RULE 58 OF THE RULES & REGULATIONS OF THE STATE BoAIW
OF ACCOUNTANCY (1962).
106 Id. at 4.
1Id. at 10.
108 In Biakanja v. Irving, 310 P.2d 63, 68, vacated, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16,
the court stated "A regulatory statute is enacted for the benefit of those who might be
injured in the absence of such regulation." The court held that section 6125 of the
Business and Professions Code (prohibiting practice of law without a license) was en-
acted to protect the public. See generally 44 CALIF. L. R v. 403 (1956).
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harmed by his reliance upon that misrepresentation may recover dam-
age from the accountant, provided he falls within the category of those
persons to whom an accountant owes a duty. The action may be
based either on deceit or negligence. In an action for deceit, the
modem rule as applied in the Ultramares and State Street cases, is
that there is a duty to avoid making fraudulent statements which one
might reasonably foresee will induce creditors or investors to act to
their loss.109 In other jurisdictions, including California, the scope of
liability for fraud appears limited to those persons in whom the ac-
countant intended to induce reliance and who do rely in the manner
intended.110 However, the Biakania case, although in terms going no
farther than to make a negligent performer of a contract liable to a
third party, may lead to an expansion in the scope of liability of the
fraudulent representor. The court's discussion of the factors involved
in imposing negligence liability indicates a liberal trend which should
ultimately lead to an expansion of liability for the conscious wrong-
doer."'1
In an action for negligence, lack of privity is no longer a valid
defense. The old common law rule, that there is no duty of care upon
a defendant to avoid economic loss to a plaintiff not in privity, was
repudiated in New York by the Glanzer case and in California by the
Biakanja case. Although there is a duty to avoid economic loss, its
scope is narrow and uncertain. The duty of care to avoid negligent
misrepresentation is not so broad as to extend to any persons who
might foreseeably rely on the representation. The accountant's duty
does extend, however, to a specific person (or class of persons) for
a specific transaction (or class of transactions) .112 Because the test
of duty is that the accountant know not only the person or class of
persons who may rely on his report, but also the purpose for which
the report is to be used, a third party should obtain the auditor's report
directly from the accountant, informing him of the purpose for which
it is required. In this manner, the third party should come within the
accountant's scope of duty, and in the event he does not receive a
competent report, he should be able to maintain an action in negligence.
Io9 Supra note 82.
I'O Supra note 84.
Mx1 Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 439, 440 n.7 (1960).
12 Supra note 43.
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